GIOVANNI GIUGA

GIOVANNI GIUGAGIOVANNI GIUGAGIOVANNI GIUGA
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GIOVANNI GIUGA

GIOVANNI GIUGAGIOVANNI GIUGAGIOVANNI GIUGA
Home
Experiences
  • Living in Waterloo Region
  • Studying Law in Ottawa
  • Grad School in Montreal
  • Proud Laurier Golden Hawk
Writing
  • Publications
  • Copyright Troll Reform
  • Shareholder Activism
  • Amend Donation Tax Credit
  • COVID & Child Access
  • Canada-US Conventions
Blog
Background
Contact Me
More
  • Home
  • Experiences
    • Living in Waterloo Region
    • Studying Law in Ottawa
    • Grad School in Montreal
    • Proud Laurier Golden Hawk
  • Writing
    • Publications
    • Copyright Troll Reform
    • Shareholder Activism
    • Amend Donation Tax Credit
    • COVID & Child Access
    • Canada-US Conventions
  • Blog
  • Background
  • Contact Me
  • Home
  • Experiences
    • Living in Waterloo Region
    • Studying Law in Ottawa
    • Grad School in Montreal
    • Proud Laurier Golden Hawk
  • Writing
    • Publications
    • Copyright Troll Reform
    • Shareholder Activism
    • Amend Donation Tax Credit
    • COVID & Child Access
    • Canada-US Conventions
  • Blog
  • Background
  • Contact Me

Reforming the Federal Political Contribution Tax Credit

“Citizens are equals and, subject to their innate talents, should have an equal opportunity to succeed in the electoral arena irrespective of their social or economic class.”


**John Rawls from "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority"**

This blog post was originally published in the Ottawa Law Review Blog (https://rdo-olr.org/volume/blog-ue/) on April 13, 2021. 


 I would like to thank Michael J. Piaseczny, Isaac Hewitt-Harris,  Abdiasis Issa, and the two anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful  comments and feedback on an earlier version of this draft. All errors  and omissions remain my own. 

**Full citation for John Rawls quote**:

 Colin Feasby, “Continuing Questions in Canadian Political Finance Law:  Third Parties and Small Political Parties” (2010) 47:4 Alta L Rev 993 at 996, citing John Rawls, “The Basic Liberties and Their Priority” in  Stephen Darwell, ed, Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973) at 225.

A Case for a Refundable Federal Political Contributions Tax

Most individuals making political donations have higher incomes, social networks, and levels of political engagement.[1] These  donor characteristics likely come as no surprise. As an aphorism goes,  “money is the lifeblood of politics.” Naturally, political parties and  candidates are “more attentive or sympathetic to the concerns or  interests of donors, which can affect political discourse and policy  outcomes.”[2] The federal government encourages individuals to make political  donations through the Political Contributions Tax Credit (PCTC).


I argue that the PCTC must be a refundable tax credit to gradually  increase some marginalized groups’ citizen participation. The PCTC is a  non-refundable tax credit.[3] An individual receives refundable tax credits regardless of the taxes  owed, and non-refundable tax credits reduce only the taxes owed on an  individual’s taxable income.[4]


Every individual making a valid (federal) political monetary donation is eligible for the PCTC. The Canada Elections Act caps an individual’s political contribution limit at $1,500, with an annual increase of $25. For 2021, the limit is $1,650.[5] The PCTC calculates the tax credit amount using a progressive structure:

  • when that total does not exceed $400, 75% of that total,
  • when that total exceeds $400 and does not exceed $750, $300 plus 50% of the amount by which that total exceeds $400, and
  • when that total exceeds $750, the lesser of
  • $650, and
  • $475 plus 33 1/3% of the amount by which the total exceeds $750.[6]


The maximum credit available is $650.[7] The PCTC’s declining rate structure is considered a good example of  promoting “a more genuine pluralism by providing a larger subsidy for  small and medium-sized donations and a smaller subsidy for large  donations.”[8] For example, an individual donating $200 will get a PCTC for 75% of the donation amount (or $150).


The PCTC serves as one of the main public funding sources for political parties.[9] Another public funding source is the “reimbursement of election expenses for candidates and political parties.”[10] However, this blog post solely focuses on improving the PCTC compared to other funding sources for Canada’s political parties.[11]


1. A refundable Political Contribution Tax Credit (PCTC) is a tax expenditure that offers some benefits and limitations.


The PCTC is a tax expenditure because, unlike a technical tax  provision, it incentivizes individuals to make political donations,  which improves the civil society[12] through encouraging “broad citizen participation in the electoral process.”[13] The PCTC is likely situated within the tax expenditures incentive  category because it ensures “political parties are the principal vehicle  for communal political organization”[14] by “reducing the after-tax cost” for taxpayers making political donations.[15] Professor Neil Brooks proposes the following questions to analyze tax expenditures:


  1. Do they serve legitimate and important objectives of government policy?
  2. Are they effective in achieving their objectives?
  3. Do they achieve their objectives equitably?
  4. Do their benefits outweigh their costs?
  5. Are there alternative policy instruments that would achieve the government’s objectives more effectively and equitably?[16]


1.1. A non-refundable PCTC addresses an important objective but is ineffective and inequitable.

The PCTC serves a legitimate and important objective because it  rewards any individual’s eligible political donation. However, the PCTC  is likely ineffective in achieving this objective even though it was  claimed by 147,000 individuals in 2017 and provided approximately $25  million back into Canadians’ pockets.[17] A 2011 study on non-refundable tax expenditures  found that the top 1% of income recipients benefitted the most from the PCTC.[18]


The PCTC is unlikely to achieve an equitable result because its  non-refundable status often rewards higher-income recipients more than  lower-income recipients. Professor Neil Brooks describes that,  generally, all tax credits should be refundable because, “[a]n individual  who is entitled to a tax credit and whose tax liability is not  sufficient for full offset of the credit should have the excess credit  refunded as a transfer payment. If credits are not refundable, many  low-income people are excluded from being beneficiaries of the spending  program.”[19] For example, many eligible claimants cannot access the disability tax  credit (DTC) because they have “insufficient taxable income to benefit  from the [disability tax] credit”[20]  compared to other eligible claimants. Some scholars advocate for  changing the disability tax credit’s designation because it would  improve its availability and better achieve the tax credit’s objective.[21] The DTC is analogous to the PCTC because of the lack of low-income claimants accessing the PCTC.[22]


1.2. A refundable PCTC offsets some of its counterparts’ costs while keeping its benefits.

The benefits of a non-refundable PCTC fail to outweigh its costs  because it encourages only a narrow group of income recipients to  participate. Under a refundable PCTC, low-or middle-income individuals  are more likely to benefit because they are no longer limited by their  taxable income when making smaller donations. Students, seniors, or  persons with disabilities with fixed or limited incomes are unlikely to  have sufficient taxable income to benefit from claiming a non-refundable  tax credit. However, no existing research makes the causal link between  any of these social groups and claiming the PCTC.


Professors Randy Besco and Erin Tolley find that “[r]elative to their  share of the population, most ethnic minority groups donate less often  than Canadians with European surnames. Black, Chinese, Other East Asian,  and Middle Eastern and North African Canadians all donate at rates  below their proportion of the population.”[23] An overwhelming majority of donations come from donors of European  ethnicity, but donor ethnicity does not impact the average size of a  donation—which could be a product of contribution limits.[24]


However, PCTC claiming patterns are gendered.[25] Women are less likely to donate and, when they do, they make smaller political contributions compared to men.[26] Although, among 2017 sole filers, women (54.7%) are slightly more likely to claim the PCTC compared to men (45.3%).[27] Still, male spouses (69.4%) are more likely to claim the PCTC compared to female spouses (30.6%).[28]


1.3. Other policy instruments can encourage individuals to participate in the electoral process.


Tax expenditures are often less effective compared to other policy solutions.[29] For example, the Per-Vote Subsidy program (PVS) offered quarterly  payments to political parties based on their previous electoral results  from 2004-2015.[30] Under PVS, an individual funds their preferred political party by  voting for them. This policy instrument is more effective because more  individuals vote than currently claim the PCTC.[31]


The PCTC’s abolishment—for an alternative policy instrument—creates a  challenge because high-income individuals will benefit  disproportionately from voting while and still making donations. The  PCTC seeks to offset a barrier for individuals to make political  donations, which remains a distinct form of political participation.  Individual political donations are likely here to stay because political  expression lays “at the heart of the guarantee of free expression and  underpins the very foundation of our democracy.”[32] Without any tax incentives, the interests of high-income individuals  will likely get more exposure. A refundable PCTC provides a modest step  forward because it better meets the tax expenditure criteria and  encourages other income class donors.


2. A potential way forward: aligning Canada’s federal political finance regime with Ontario’s recent reforms. 

Ontario’s current regime outlines a potential political finance model  for the federal regime to adopt. Ontario’s tax credit is refundable.[33] Ontario’s political finance regime encourages individuals to make donations, [34] contains contribution limits,[35] and offers a similar declining tax credit rate structure.[36] Ontario’s approach also provides a policy implementation mechanism for  ensuring that eligible individuals receive the excess credit amount  “after the Canada Revenue Agency has assessed [their] return.”[37] Ontario’s Bill 254 also allows political parties to receive a per-vote  subsidy based on past election results as another source of public  funding.[38]


In sum, a refundable PCTC incentivizes the participation of  underrepresented groups within the political marketplace. It remains  only one source of public funding for political parties.


Citations


[1] Erin Tolley, Randy Besco & Semra Sevi, “Who Controls the Purse  Strings? A Longitudinal Study of Gender and Donations in Canadian  Politics” (2020) Politics & Gender 1 at 5, online (pdf): Cambridge University Press <www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/abs/who-controls-the-purse-strings-a-longitudinal-study-of-gender-and-donations-in-canadian-politics/C9022C261315FB306100D76998871AB8>.

[2] Ibid at 2.


[3] See “Report on Federal Tax Expenditures: Concepts, Estimates and Evaluations” (2020), online at 223 (pdf):  Department of Finance<www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/services/publications/federal-tax-expenditures/2020.html> [“Dept. Finance”].


[4] See Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, “8.3.6 Non-refundable and  refundable tax credits” (last modified 22 December 2020) online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/financial-consumer-agency/services/financial-toolkit/taxes/taxes-3/7.html>.


[5] SC 2000, c 9 s 367(1)-(1.1). See Elections Canada, “Limits on Contributions” (last accessed 6 January 2021) online: Elections Canada<www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=pol&document=index&dir=lim&lang=e>.


[6] Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1, s 127(3).

[7] Dept. Finance, supra note 5 at 223.


[8] David G Duff, “Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions in Canada:  Theory, Practice, and Reform” (2004) 42:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 47 at 69.


[9] See Peter Aucoin & Herman Bakvis, “Canadian Public Funding of  Parties and the End of Per-Vote Subsidies: Parties, Strategic Interests,  and Decartelization” in Richard Johnston and Campbell Sharman, eds, Parties and Party Systems: Structure and Context (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2015) 222 where they  also provide a general overview of Canada’s election law regime at  224-225. See generally Susan E Scarrow, “Political Finance in  Comparative Perspective” (2007) 10 Annual Rev Political Science 193 (for  a more robust list of different political financing approaches at 197).


[10] Colin Feasby, “Canadian Political Finance Regulation and Jurisprudence”  in Keith Ewing, Jacob Rowbottom & Joo-Cheong Tham, eds, The Funding of Political Parties: Where Now? (London: Routledge, 2012) 206 at 208 [Feasby, “CPF Regulation and  Jurisprudence”]; Colin Feasby, “Contemporary Issues in Canadian  Political Finance Regulation” (2010) 6:3 Policy Q 14 at 15.


[11] This blog post’s short nature encourages further research and debate on  other components of the political finance regime. Future blog posts  could discuss how political parties are funded broadly or the preferred  ratio of public to private funding. See e.g. An Act providing for  conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing and  measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and  accountability, SC 2006, c 9. Private funding occurs only when  individuals make political donations to a political party because unions  and corporate donations were banned in 2006. See generally Lisa Young  & Harold J Jansen, “Reforming Party and Election Finance in Canada”  in Lisa Young & Harold J Jansen, eds, Money, Politics, and Democracy: Canada’s Party Finance Reforms (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011) 1.


[12] See Ken Boessenkool, “Policy Forum: Kids Are Not Boats” (2015) 63:4 Can  Tax J 1001 at 1009 (for a six-category framework of when a government  should encourage positive social behaviour through the tax system such  as improving civil society at 1006). See also Scarrow, supra note 11 at 202, 207.

[13] Dept. Finance, supra note 5 at 223.


[14] Feasby, “CPF Regulation and Jurisprudence” supra note 12 at 207, citing Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, vol 1 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991) (Chair: Pierre Lorite) at 11–13.


[15] Neil Brooks, “Policy Forum: The Case Against Boutique Tax Credits and Similar Tax Expenditures” (2016) 64:1 Can Tax J 65 at 71.

[16] Ibid at 96.


[17] Dept. Finance, supra note  5 at 223. See  Table 5 at 336 for information regarding the family unit  and gender analysis and examples of refundable tax credits.


[18] See Brian Murphy, Mike Veall & Michael Wolfson, “Top-End  Progressivity and Federal Tax Preferences in Canada: Estimates from  Personal Income Tax Data” (2015) 63:3 Can Tax J 661 at 672. Murphy,  Veall, and Wolfson identified that the regressive nature of the PCTC was  “relatively small” because it satisfied their “alternative tax payment  definition [in which] the benefits of the tax expenditure to the top 1  percent of income recipients exceed 11.7 percent but are less than 21.4  percent.”

[19] Brooks, supra note 18 at 106.


[20] Wayne Simpson & Harvey Stevens, “The Disability Tax Credit: Why it  Fails and How to Fix it” (2016) 9:24 SPP Research Papers 1 at 16, online  (pdf): University of Calgary <www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/disability-tax-credits-simpson-stevens.pdf>.

[21] Ibid at 1–2. See also Dept. Finance, supra note  5 at 127, where the disability tax credit’s objective is to improve  “tax fairness by recognizing the effect of a severe and prolonged  disability on an individual’s ability to pay tax.” Cf Duff, supra note  10 at 69, where the charitable contributions tax credit “should be  fully refundable in order to ensure that the subsidy is available for  donors whose incomes are too low to pay tax.”


[22] See Wayne Simpson & Harvey Stevens, “The Impact of Converting  Federal Non-Refundable Tax Credits into Refundable Credits” (2015) 8:30  SPP Research Papers 1, online (pdf): University of Calgary <www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/tax-credits-simpson-stevens.pdf>,  where the authors present different economic frameworks that show the  potential cost-benefit for converting every non-refundable tax credit to  a refundable tax credit.


[23] Randy Besco & Erin Tolley “Ethnic Group Differences in Donations to  Electoral Candidates” (2020) J Ethnic and Migration Studies 1 at 17,  online (pdf): Taylor & Francis Group  <www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1804339> (Besco  and Tolley’s work illustrates the “importance of disaggregating racial  and ethnic groups” because South Asian Canadians have a higher donation  rate, ibid).

[24] Ibid at 19.

[25] Dept. Finance, supra note 5 at 341.


[26] Erin Tolley, Randy Besco & Semra Sevi, “Who Controls the Purse  Strings? A Longitudinal Study of Gender and Donations in Canadian  Politics” (2020) Politics & Gender 1 at 1, online (pdf): Cambridge University Press <www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/abs/who-controls-the-purse-strings-a-longitudinal-study-of-gender-and-donations-in-canadian-politics/C9022C261315FB306100D76998871AB8>.

[27] Dept. Finance, supra note 5 at 336.

[28] Ibid at 340.

[29] Brooks, supra note 17 at 119. Brooks addresses other concerns with tax expenditures at 86–96.

[30] Aucoin & Bakvis, supra note  11 (another added benefit is minor political parties are in a better  financial position to compete over time, such as the Green Party of  Canada during this period, ibid at 222).


[31] See Dept. Finance, supra note 5 at 223; Elections Canada, “Voter Turnout at Federal Elections and Referendums” (last modified 3 December 2020), online: Elections Canada <www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=ele&dir=turn&document=index&lang=e>


[32] Harper v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33 at para 41.


[33] Taxation Act, 2007, SO 2007, c 11, Sch A, s 84(1) [“Taxation Act, 2007”].

[34] Ibid, s 16.


[35] Election Finances Act, RSO 1990, c E.7, s 18.

[36] Taxation Act, 2007, supra note 34, s 102.


[37] Ontario Ministry of Finance, “Political Contribution Tax Credit for Individuals” (last modified 17 January 2020), online: Queen’s Printer for Ontario <www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/credit/pctc/>.


[38] Bill 254, An Act to amend various Acts with respect to elections and members of the Assembly, 1st Sess, 42nd Leg, Ontario, 2021 (first reading 25 February 2021).

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