**John Rawls from "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority"**
This blog post was originally published in the Ottawa Law Review Blog (https://rdo-olr.org/volume/blog-ue/) on April 13, 2021.
I would like to thank Michael J. Piaseczny, Isaac Hewitt-Harris, Abdiasis Issa, and the two anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful comments and feedback on an earlier version of this draft. All errors and omissions remain my own.
**Full citation for John Rawls quote**:
Colin Feasby, “Continuing Questions in Canadian Political Finance Law: Third Parties and Small Political Parties” (2010) 47:4 Alta L Rev 993 at 996, citing John Rawls, “The Basic Liberties and Their Priority” in Stephen Darwell, ed, Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973) at 225.
Most individuals making political donations have higher incomes, social networks, and levels of political engagement.[1] These donor characteristics likely come as no surprise. As an aphorism goes, “money is the lifeblood of politics.” Naturally, political parties and candidates are “more attentive or sympathetic to the concerns or interests of donors, which can affect political discourse and policy outcomes.”[2] The federal government encourages individuals to make political donations through the Political Contributions Tax Credit (PCTC).
I argue that the PCTC must be a refundable tax credit to gradually increase some marginalized groups’ citizen participation. The PCTC is a non-refundable tax credit.[3] An individual receives refundable tax credits regardless of the taxes owed, and non-refundable tax credits reduce only the taxes owed on an individual’s taxable income.[4]
Every individual making a valid (federal) political monetary donation is eligible for the PCTC. The Canada Elections Act caps an individual’s political contribution limit at $1,500, with an annual increase of $25. For 2021, the limit is $1,650.[5] The PCTC calculates the tax credit amount using a progressive structure:
The maximum credit available is $650.[7] The PCTC’s declining rate structure is considered a good example of promoting “a more genuine pluralism by providing a larger subsidy for small and medium-sized donations and a smaller subsidy for large donations.”[8] For example, an individual donating $200 will get a PCTC for 75% of the donation amount (or $150).
The PCTC serves as one of the main public funding sources for political parties.[9] Another public funding source is the “reimbursement of election expenses for candidates and political parties.”[10] However, this blog post solely focuses on improving the PCTC compared to other funding sources for Canada’s political parties.[11]
The PCTC is a tax expenditure because, unlike a technical tax provision, it incentivizes individuals to make political donations, which improves the civil society[12] through encouraging “broad citizen participation in the electoral process.”[13] The PCTC is likely situated within the tax expenditures incentive category because it ensures “political parties are the principal vehicle for communal political organization”[14] by “reducing the after-tax cost” for taxpayers making political donations.[15] Professor Neil Brooks proposes the following questions to analyze tax expenditures:
The PCTC serves a legitimate and important objective because it rewards any individual’s eligible political donation. However, the PCTC is likely ineffective in achieving this objective even though it was claimed by 147,000 individuals in 2017 and provided approximately $25 million back into Canadians’ pockets.[17] A 2011 study on non-refundable tax expenditures found that the top 1% of income recipients benefitted the most from the PCTC.[18]
The PCTC is unlikely to achieve an equitable result because its non-refundable status often rewards higher-income recipients more than lower-income recipients. Professor Neil Brooks describes that, generally, all tax credits should be refundable because, “[a]n individual who is entitled to a tax credit and whose tax liability is not sufficient for full offset of the credit should have the excess credit refunded as a transfer payment. If credits are not refundable, many low-income people are excluded from being beneficiaries of the spending program.”[19] For example, many eligible claimants cannot access the disability tax credit (DTC) because they have “insufficient taxable income to benefit from the [disability tax] credit”[20] compared to other eligible claimants. Some scholars advocate for changing the disability tax credit’s designation because it would improve its availability and better achieve the tax credit’s objective.[21] The DTC is analogous to the PCTC because of the lack of low-income claimants accessing the PCTC.[22]
The benefits of a non-refundable PCTC fail to outweigh its costs because it encourages only a narrow group of income recipients to participate. Under a refundable PCTC, low-or middle-income individuals are more likely to benefit because they are no longer limited by their taxable income when making smaller donations. Students, seniors, or persons with disabilities with fixed or limited incomes are unlikely to have sufficient taxable income to benefit from claiming a non-refundable tax credit. However, no existing research makes the causal link between any of these social groups and claiming the PCTC.
Professors Randy Besco and Erin Tolley find that “[r]elative to their share of the population, most ethnic minority groups donate less often than Canadians with European surnames. Black, Chinese, Other East Asian, and Middle Eastern and North African Canadians all donate at rates below their proportion of the population.”[23] An overwhelming majority of donations come from donors of European ethnicity, but donor ethnicity does not impact the average size of a donation—which could be a product of contribution limits.[24]
However, PCTC claiming patterns are gendered.[25] Women are less likely to donate and, when they do, they make smaller political contributions compared to men.[26] Although, among 2017 sole filers, women (54.7%) are slightly more likely to claim the PCTC compared to men (45.3%).[27] Still, male spouses (69.4%) are more likely to claim the PCTC compared to female spouses (30.6%).[28]
Tax expenditures are often less effective compared to other policy solutions.[29] For example, the Per-Vote Subsidy program (PVS) offered quarterly payments to political parties based on their previous electoral results from 2004-2015.[30] Under PVS, an individual funds their preferred political party by voting for them. This policy instrument is more effective because more individuals vote than currently claim the PCTC.[31]
The PCTC’s abolishment—for an alternative policy instrument—creates a challenge because high-income individuals will benefit disproportionately from voting while and still making donations. The PCTC seeks to offset a barrier for individuals to make political donations, which remains a distinct form of political participation. Individual political donations are likely here to stay because political expression lays “at the heart of the guarantee of free expression and underpins the very foundation of our democracy.”[32] Without any tax incentives, the interests of high-income individuals will likely get more exposure. A refundable PCTC provides a modest step forward because it better meets the tax expenditure criteria and encourages other income class donors.
Ontario’s current regime outlines a potential political finance model for the federal regime to adopt. Ontario’s tax credit is refundable.[33] Ontario’s political finance regime encourages individuals to make donations, [34] contains contribution limits,[35] and offers a similar declining tax credit rate structure.[36] Ontario’s approach also provides a policy implementation mechanism for ensuring that eligible individuals receive the excess credit amount “after the Canada Revenue Agency has assessed [their] return.”[37] Ontario’s Bill 254 also allows political parties to receive a per-vote subsidy based on past election results as another source of public funding.[38]
In sum, a refundable PCTC incentivizes the participation of underrepresented groups within the political marketplace. It remains only one source of public funding for political parties.
[1] Erin Tolley, Randy Besco & Semra Sevi, “Who Controls the Purse Strings? A Longitudinal Study of Gender and Donations in Canadian Politics” (2020) Politics & Gender 1 at 5, online (pdf): Cambridge University Press <www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/abs/who-controls-the-purse-strings-a-longitudinal-study-of-gender-and-donations-in-canadian-politics/C9022C261315FB306100D76998871AB8>.
[2] Ibid at 2.
[3] See “Report on Federal Tax Expenditures: Concepts, Estimates and Evaluations” (2020), online at 223 (pdf): Department of Finance<www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/services/publications/federal-tax-expenditures/2020.html> [“Dept. Finance”].
[4] See Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, “8.3.6 Non-refundable and refundable tax credits” (last modified 22 December 2020) online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/financial-consumer-agency/services/financial-toolkit/taxes/taxes-3/7.html>.
[5] SC 2000, c 9 s 367(1)-(1.1). See Elections Canada, “Limits on Contributions” (last accessed 6 January 2021) online: Elections Canada<www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=pol&document=index&dir=lim&lang=e>.
[6] Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1, s 127(3).
[7] Dept. Finance, supra note 5 at 223.
[8] David G Duff, “Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions in Canada: Theory, Practice, and Reform” (2004) 42:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 47 at 69.
[9] See Peter Aucoin & Herman Bakvis, “Canadian Public Funding of Parties and the End of Per-Vote Subsidies: Parties, Strategic Interests, and Decartelization” in Richard Johnston and Campbell Sharman, eds, Parties and Party Systems: Structure and Context (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2015) 222 where they also provide a general overview of Canada’s election law regime at 224-225. See generally Susan E Scarrow, “Political Finance in Comparative Perspective” (2007) 10 Annual Rev Political Science 193 (for a more robust list of different political financing approaches at 197).
[10] Colin Feasby, “Canadian Political Finance Regulation and Jurisprudence” in Keith Ewing, Jacob Rowbottom & Joo-Cheong Tham, eds, The Funding of Political Parties: Where Now? (London: Routledge, 2012) 206 at 208 [Feasby, “CPF Regulation and Jurisprudence”]; Colin Feasby, “Contemporary Issues in Canadian Political Finance Regulation” (2010) 6:3 Policy Q 14 at 15.
[11] This blog post’s short nature encourages further research and debate on other components of the political finance regime. Future blog posts could discuss how political parties are funded broadly or the preferred ratio of public to private funding. See e.g. An Act providing for conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and accountability, SC 2006, c 9. Private funding occurs only when individuals make political donations to a political party because unions and corporate donations were banned in 2006. See generally Lisa Young & Harold J Jansen, “Reforming Party and Election Finance in Canada” in Lisa Young & Harold J Jansen, eds, Money, Politics, and Democracy: Canada’s Party Finance Reforms (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011) 1.
[12] See Ken Boessenkool, “Policy Forum: Kids Are Not Boats” (2015) 63:4 Can Tax J 1001 at 1009 (for a six-category framework of when a government should encourage positive social behaviour through the tax system such as improving civil society at 1006). See also Scarrow, supra note 11 at 202, 207.
[13] Dept. Finance, supra note 5 at 223.
[14] Feasby, “CPF Regulation and Jurisprudence” supra note 12 at 207, citing Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, vol 1 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991) (Chair: Pierre Lorite) at 11–13.
[15] Neil Brooks, “Policy Forum: The Case Against Boutique Tax Credits and Similar Tax Expenditures” (2016) 64:1 Can Tax J 65 at 71.
[16] Ibid at 96.
[17] Dept. Finance, supra note 5 at 223. See Table 5 at 336 for information regarding the family unit and gender analysis and examples of refundable tax credits.
[18] See Brian Murphy, Mike Veall & Michael Wolfson, “Top-End Progressivity and Federal Tax Preferences in Canada: Estimates from Personal Income Tax Data” (2015) 63:3 Can Tax J 661 at 672. Murphy, Veall, and Wolfson identified that the regressive nature of the PCTC was “relatively small” because it satisfied their “alternative tax payment definition [in which] the benefits of the tax expenditure to the top 1 percent of income recipients exceed 11.7 percent but are less than 21.4 percent.”
[19] Brooks, supra note 18 at 106.
[20] Wayne Simpson & Harvey Stevens, “The Disability Tax Credit: Why it Fails and How to Fix it” (2016) 9:24 SPP Research Papers 1 at 16, online (pdf): University of Calgary <www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/disability-tax-credits-simpson-stevens.pdf>.
[21] Ibid at 1–2. See also Dept. Finance, supra note 5 at 127, where the disability tax credit’s objective is to improve “tax fairness by recognizing the effect of a severe and prolonged disability on an individual’s ability to pay tax.” Cf Duff, supra note 10 at 69, where the charitable contributions tax credit “should be fully refundable in order to ensure that the subsidy is available for donors whose incomes are too low to pay tax.”
[22] See Wayne Simpson & Harvey Stevens, “The Impact of Converting Federal Non-Refundable Tax Credits into Refundable Credits” (2015) 8:30 SPP Research Papers 1, online (pdf): University of Calgary <www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/tax-credits-simpson-stevens.pdf>, where the authors present different economic frameworks that show the potential cost-benefit for converting every non-refundable tax credit to a refundable tax credit.
[23] Randy Besco & Erin Tolley “Ethnic Group Differences in Donations to Electoral Candidates” (2020) J Ethnic and Migration Studies 1 at 17, online (pdf): Taylor & Francis Group <www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1804339> (Besco and Tolley’s work illustrates the “importance of disaggregating racial and ethnic groups” because South Asian Canadians have a higher donation rate, ibid).
[24] Ibid at 19.
[25] Dept. Finance, supra note 5 at 341.
[26] Erin Tolley, Randy Besco & Semra Sevi, “Who Controls the Purse Strings? A Longitudinal Study of Gender and Donations in Canadian Politics” (2020) Politics & Gender 1 at 1, online (pdf): Cambridge University Press <www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/abs/who-controls-the-purse-strings-a-longitudinal-study-of-gender-and-donations-in-canadian-politics/C9022C261315FB306100D76998871AB8>.
[27] Dept. Finance, supra note 5 at 336.
[28] Ibid at 340.
[29] Brooks, supra note 17 at 119. Brooks addresses other concerns with tax expenditures at 86–96.
[30] Aucoin & Bakvis, supra note 11 (another added benefit is minor political parties are in a better financial position to compete over time, such as the Green Party of Canada during this period, ibid at 222).
[31] See Dept. Finance, supra note 5 at 223; Elections Canada, “Voter Turnout at Federal Elections and Referendums” (last modified 3 December 2020), online: Elections Canada <www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=ele&dir=turn&document=index&lang=e>
[32] Harper v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33 at para 41.
[33] Taxation Act, 2007, SO 2007, c 11, Sch A, s 84(1) [“Taxation Act, 2007”].
[34] Ibid, s 16.
[35] Election Finances Act, RSO 1990, c E.7, s 18.
[36] Taxation Act, 2007, supra note 34, s 102.
[37] Ontario Ministry of Finance, “Political Contribution Tax Credit for Individuals” (last modified 17 January 2020), online: Queen’s Printer for Ontario <www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/credit/pctc/>.
[38] Bill 254, An Act to amend various Acts with respect to elections and members of the Assembly, 1st Sess, 42nd Leg, Ontario, 2021 (first reading 25 February 2021).
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